Regular onboard continuation training and realistic safety drills are of paramount importance, not simply to satisfy the requirements of Regulators or SOLAS but to ensure that, in the (hopefully unlikely) event of an incident occurring, the crew are well rehearsed on how to deal and behave in emergency situations and survive the unexpected. It’s the best way to verify crew’s readiness, response reactions and under stress actions is to provide drill scenarios as similar to real life situations as possible.
Some say or treat emergency drills are a nuisance, and for those drills which are really worthwhile – those which are unexpected and inconvenient – there is probably an element of active dislike. Diligent drills, which can drive the crew half mad ultimately, will save their lives when they have to fight a fire or abandon ship in a hurry.
Real life experiences shared as Lessons learned from incidents that occurred in the industry and ourselves have taught us that those who work and live on board must always be prepared to expect the unexpected, the consequences of which can result in fire or flood and possibly a subsequent need to abandon ship and to be rescued. You also need to be aware of the potential psychological effects of a crisis or traumatic experience at sea, and to know where you can find advice and support.
Lesson’s Learned – A bad example
Fire on board Celtic Carrier 24 miles west of Cape Trafalgar, Spain on 26 April 2013
At 0315 (UTC+2) on 26 April 2013, a fire broke out in a crew cabin on board the UK registered general cargo ship Celtic Carrier. The ship was on passage from Gibraltar to Belfast with a cargo of cement. The crew member, in whose cabin the fire started, had been consuming alcohol and smoking cigarettes. He had continued to smoke after climbing into bed and had fallen asleep while holding a lit cigarette. It is probable that the lit cigarette then melted an adjacent sofa’s vinyl covering and ignited the foam seating beneath. The crew member awoke, discovered the fire, proceeded to the bridge and informed the second officer, who then sounded the fire alarm. The crew mustered and then attempted to contain and fight the fire. However, the fire was not finally brought under control until 1226, after two fire-fighting teams had transferred to the ship from a Spanish naval vessel. The fire was subsequently extinguished and Celtic Carrier was then towed to Cadiz, arriving at 0545 on 27 April. Three crew cabins were damaged by the fire, which had caused an electrical failure of the ship’s steering gear, and the majority of the accommodation spaces were damaged by heat, smoke and water.
The investigation identified that Celtic Carrier’s crew were ill-prepared for the emergency; there was a lack of leadership, and sub-standard fire-fighting techniques resulted in crew members being unnecessarily exposed to danger. It was found that the official records of some emergency drills had been falsified, and that a complacent approach to safety existed on board.
Lessons learned – an excellent example
MR Arcturus Fire in the Engine room en route to Singapore 01 November 2016
“MR ARCTURUS” was on passage in a loaded condition from Balboa, Panama to Singapore when a fire incident in the engine room (E/R) occurred at 13:44hrs local time (LT) on 1 November 2016.
A fire alarm was activated on the main fire alarm panel located in wheelhouse/bridge indicating Zone 11. This was quickly followed by an alarm activating for Zone 12.
Contact was established between the Master, who was on the bridge at that time, and the engine control room (ECR). The 3/E informed the Master that a fire had broken out outside of the ECR and he was attempting to fight it with a portable CO2 fire extinguisher whilst the second engineer (2/E) and one engine staff had been deploying fire hoses.
At 13:46hrs LT the Chief Engineer (C/E) contacted the bridge via a radio (hand held VHF set – walkie talkie) and informed the bridge that the fire in the E/R was spreading quickly.
The M/E was stopped from the bridge at 13:48hrs and a bridge command centre was established with the Master being assisted by the second officer (2/O) and one able bodied seaman (AB) who was at the helm steering the vessel.
Confirmation was received by the bridge that all the fuel tank quick closing valves had been operated to the emergency shut position, and machinery space ventilation and fire flaps and been closed with subsequent shut down of power from main switchboard (MSB) and activation of emergency diesel generator (EDG) providing power to the emergency switchboard (ESB).
All men were accounted for after the evacuation of the E/R, and boundary cooling to the aft and funnel areas was being carried out. The first firefighting team attempted to enter the E/R via the steering gear flat but could not proceed due to thick smoke and excessive heat. A back up team attempted entry into the E/R via the inert gas (IG) flat, however they also could not proceed due to the thick smoke and heat.
Having confirmed that all personnel were accounted for, the Master decided that due the severity of the fire it was necessary to release the CO2 fixed firefighting system and instructed the C/E activate. This the instruction C/E carried out and at 14:03hrs CO2 flooding was introduced into the machinery space.
The C/E noted and informed the Master that there was no more signs of fire observed from the funnel and it was decided that ventilation of the E/R could be started. At 15:10hrs a firefighting team started entering the E/R to check for signs of fire.
15:26hrs the fire was declared totally extinguished, and ships staff commenced assessing damage and restoring main power and systems, and at 18:06hrs the M/E was restarted and the vessel resumed on sea passage thereafter to Singapore for repairs and discharge of cargo.
Following paragraphs state the conclusion of the LOC Investigator on the incident:
“From my review of the documentation provided and my inspection of the machinery spaces I am of the opinion that the vessel was well maintained and that the safety equipment was all up to date and in good operational order. Records indicated an effective SMS, regular safety drills and training.
Ship’s crew reacted quickly to the situation and demonstrated that the drills and training undergone prior to the incident were of value. The fire was contained within a reasonable time and as a result of the actions of the crew in attempting to contain the fire minimized the severity of the fire and resultant damage. The situation and severity of the fire could have very easily worsened and got out of control with all of the disastrous consequences that would have followed.
I am of the opinion that action taken and decisions made were appropriate in consideration of the vessel’s location, condition and difficulties experienced in establishing communications with the office. This is borne out by the successful extinguishing of the fire. Based on the documents reviewed I am of the opinion that the crew carried out their duties to the best of their abilities, and that the Master executed management throughout the situation in an appropriate manner.
I am also of the opinion that the fire was a result of a leaking flange on the MGO line that was in the near vicinity to No.3 D/G exhaust uptake, and MGO spraying onto the uptake in way of the underside of the first deck.
It appears that the MGO ignition pump pipework is shipyard installation, however it is suggested that the routing and of the pipework is reviewed and if necessary for spray protection tape to be applied where considered applicable under SOLAS regulations.”
What’s required in our safety drills on board?
Each member of the crew must be familiar with their duties and use of relevant equipment and life-saving appliances. Crew shall have access to all training manuals, the station bill, and plans associated with emergency response procedures.
The SOLAS Convention requires that drills be, to as great an extent as possible, carried out as if there were an actual emergency.
All equipment shall be utilized to the greatest extent possible during each drill without compromising the effectiveness of the equipment during a true emergency. This includes but is not limited to the operation of pumps, emergency-breathing apparatus, lowering of lifeboats etc.
Nevertheless, drill shall be held in a way that is in every respect reasonable from a safety perspective. Consequently, the elements of the drill that may involve an unnecessary risk demand special attention. Such elements of drills should be carried out while observing special precautionary measures in order to eliminate this risk and, if necessary, this element of a drill must be left out. However, this must not mean that the respect for drills is reduced.
The drill should refresh basic safety training and add an element of reality of working as part of a team onboard their own vessel. In witnessing a safe and effective drill, it is important that as many of the regular crew are present as possible.
Drills should be carried out at reasonable speed. During drills, emphasis should be placed on learning so that everybody gets familiar with their functions and with the equipment, among others in order to be able for example to launch lifeboats and liferafts quickly in an emergency.
If necessary, breaks should be held to explain especially difficult elements of drills and rehearsed again if needed.
Most commonly acknowledged, drills are synonyms to training. In some cases, are even confused and treated one and the same. This is maybe because in maritime transport, professional competence is acquired after passing competency courses, simulation training on shore and is to be further developed through drills and training on board ship.
Training is based on observation. Drills are a significant source of such training requirements. During the drills and exercises which at the end validate a drill or exercise as effectively carried out or improvements required, training needs are drafted and training is organized to take place before next scheduled drill to ensure that the next is as much as possible impeccably carried out.
Recording of drills is also very important. Entries in the bridge logbook shall be made when any safety drill is performed according to requirements of the applicable codes and conventions. All personnel shall participate in a debriefing following any drill performed on the vessel. The debriefing should evaluate effectiveness of the drill overall, areas for improvement, concerns anyone may have about their responsibilities, and any comments regarding equipment, leadership, resources etc.
Compliance requirements
The Company has developed a detailed annual Drills and Exercises planner through Benefit per vessel. Guidelines on how to fill in these drills and exercises has been circulated to you by the undersigned and HSQE Officer/DPA.
At the beginning of each year we are creating a Drills & Exercises plan that you can find at Operations/Activities->Reports->Schedule plan. You are kindly requested:
- To review this plan and follow set dates and intervals set for completing required drills and exercise; if you have any corrections that you wish to be made please communicate same to HSQE so to finalize plan. Once the plan is agreed you need to comply with it.
- In case circumstances does not allow the above mentioned drill to take place within the time frame set, HSQE shall be notified in advance (prior due date) and relevant entry shall take place to Bridge Log Book with the reason the drill had to be postponed. Once you have carried out the required drill or exercise, you are required along with the reports required to attach in attachments section a copy of the Bridge Log entry made at the date the drill was postponed.
- Keep in mind that following intervals will not be adjusted based on the new date the drill was carried out but you should follow the initial planned date. Only in cases where a drill was carried out earlier we will need to adjust the forthcoming drills accordingly always meeting the intervals required by our SMS and Flag Administration/applicable legislation. You should coordinate change this with HSQE.
- Each drill operation has detailed guidelines provided on drill requirement in “office comments” and required reporting form(s) linked and marked with [R] and a training form in case additional training took place on issued detected during the drill execution.
Your close cooperation with HSQE is necessary for an effectively implemented planning and proper recording and reporting of drills something that is a hot topic on PSC and Flag State Annual Safety Inspections at all times.
Source: Z. Lempesi / HSQE Manager